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FOREWORD

In 1931, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
penned the following thoughts on innovation: “We must
hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of
unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be
won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will
go under.” As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) adapts to the emerging strategic environment, it
must consider innovative organizational structures that
will allow it to harness the potential of its European
partners.
In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen
examines NATO’s enduring deficiencies and their
detrimental effect on military capabilities. The decade
following the end of the Cold War has revealed a far
different world than envisioned. As the United States
ruefully discovered, the reduced threat did not diminish
security obligations. NATO’s European members hoped
otherwise and paid insufficient attention to military
capabilities. NATO enlargement exacerbates the existing
problems. NATO’s integrated military structure does not
easily accommodate the new members, which still suffer
from the effects of the Soviet system. Simply put, their
nascent market economies and unsophisticated militaries
represent great obstacles to NATO interoperability.
Lieutenant Colonel Millen explores the establishment of
integrated multinational divisions as a solution to NATO’s
salient problems. The co-stationing of Allied units in
existing casernes and under a host division headquarters
certainly provides opportunities worth discussing.
Streamlining the Alliance to a single active corps of ten
divisions and the establishment of a robust logistical supply
group permits greater utility of limited manpower and
equipment. Under this structure, all Alliance members can
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focus modernization on select units and become active
participants in all NATO operations.
As Lieutenant Colonel Millen points out, this bold
approach creates challenges for the Alliance, but the
tremendous benefits outweigh the short-term risks. To
remain relevant, the Alliance must seek innovations.
Otherwise, it will become a Cold War relic.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a topic of debate that will continue well into
the millennium.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The greatest peril to NATO is not a matter of relevancy
but rather the inability to adapt to European realities and
enduring deficiencies. Insufficient military spending and
investment as well as significant downsizing have resulted
in an ever-widening capabilities and interoperability gulf
between the United States and the Alliance partners. The
Defense Capabilities Initiative will likely not bear fruit
because the Allies are incapable of correcting the identified
deficiencies under existing budget constraints. NATO may
have broadened its mandate to include crisis response
operations, but European military forces are incapable of
swift power projection and will suffer inveterate manpower
shortages for deployed forces. Multinational corps and
divisions suffer from the enduring problems with command
authority, transfer of authority, and corps combat service
support. NATO’s approach to multinational formations
suffers from a lack of true integration. Subordinate units
are isolated from each other until assembled for a crisis.
This approach is akin to baking a cake without mixing the
ingredients beforehand.
The problems associated with veteran members pale in
comparison to NATO’s new members and candidates. The
lingering effects of the communist economies and the Soviet
integrated military structure represent enduring barriers
to swift integration with the Alliance. Several more years of
reforms are necessary before the new members can
contribute to the existing NATO integrated military
structure. Financing a modern, interoperable force is
simply beyond their economic capabilities. NATO
enlargement is a superb initiative, enhancing European
stability and security, but without the ability to harness the
potential of new members, NATO will lamentably view
them as not-ready-for-primetime and continue to
marginalize them.
vi

The vast majority of NATO’s ailments can be cured by
the adoption of integrated multinational divisions (IMD),
meaning the subordinate brigades and battalions are
stationed together under the host division headquarters.
The IMD allows every NATO member to contribute forces
according to its size and relative wealth. Integration of new
members will proceed more quickly and assuredly because
they have the opportunity to train intimately with Allied
units. Language immersion as well as daily contact with
democratic values and Western culture creates stronger
bonds among members. For the Alliance as a whole, IMDs
allow for a greater pooling of resources and manpower and
permit focused modernization of the force contributions.
IMDs permit NATO to rely on the Allied Command
Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as the centerpiece of
the Alliance with a dedicated, robust combat service
support group and rotating commanding general.
Maintenance and modernization of two other corps
headquarters are crucial to ensure seamless command and
control for enduring peace support operations. Such an
approach permits Allies to lower the readiness of their
remaining divisions and brigades until mobilized for major
threats. The result is a more cohesive, modern, mobile
NATO at a pittance of the current cost. Perhaps, these
reforms can lower the defense spending obligation to 1.5
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) without
lowering military capabilities.
Recommendations.
The United States can improve its strategic position and
cohesion by pursuing the following:

•

Convert the two U.S. divisions in Europe into IMDs in
order to assist in the assimilation of new members
into the Alliance.
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•

Encourage other NATO members to adopt this model
in order to make more effective use of their military
spending and resources.

•

Establish the ARRC as NATO’s higher readiness force
for all missions and maintain the EUROCORPS and
EUROFOR corps headquarters, sufficiently staffed
and equipped with the most modern and robust
command and control systems. Rotate the command
of the ARRC among the contributing members.

•

Expand the existing ARRC combat support (CS) and
combat service support (CSS) base into an Area
Support Group (ASG) equivalent to provide assured
logistics during training and deployments. The ASG
must be sufficiently large to support multiple
rotations during extended peace support operations
(PSO).

The IMD architecture means that all Allies share
responsibilities, risks, and benefits. With all members
actively engaged in operations, the United States will not
feel compelled to take unilateral military action or
constantly bear the lion’s share of military operations.
Making the necessary reforms will be a challenge and will
require substantial marketing of the idea, but the
alternative solutions are no cure. NATO must break the
mold and grasp the opportunities.
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TWEAKING NATO:
THE CASE FOR INTEGRATED
MULTINATIONAL DIVISIONS

Introduction.
NATO continues as the most successful and enduring
alliance in history. Notwithstanding a handful of
dissenting viewpoints, NATO has no security peers. Even
so, its preeminent role in European security is not a
foregone conclusion. Given Europe’s stable situation,
NATO’s continued relevance is predicated less on collective
defense than on collective security.
Post-Cold War initiatives, such as the Defense
Capabilities Initiative, Combined Joint Task Force, and the
European Security and Defense Policy, are laudable but
address the manifestations and not the ailments plaguing
the Alliance: burden sharing, command authority,
interoperability, and diminishing military capabilities. The
current political atmosphere and integrated military
structure cannot reconcile these opposing forces. Another
approach is needed—integrated multinational divisions
(IMDs). At first glance, the reader may dismiss this
approach as hackneyed, but the details reveal its
practicability.
The first part of this monograph examines the enduring
European NATO member deficiencies and the chronic
assimilation difficulties of new members with the Alliance.
The second part examines the opportunities presented
through the restructuring of NATO nation land forces into
IMDs and some recommendations for streamlining the
integrated military structure. Through such reforms,
NATO will gain enhanced interoperability, equalize burden
sharing, mitigate ongoing command authority issues and
accommodate existing lower defense spending. The U.S.
Army will benefit by cultivating the military potential of
1

every member and allowing it to realign forces in accordance
with U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military
Strategy without commitment penalties. Consequently,
NATO not only will continue to be relevant but also a more
cohesive and adaptive security organization for the future
strategic environment.
European Deficiencies.
Technological Shortcomings. The technological gap
between the United States and its NATO Allies is
increasing, adversely affecting interoperability and
Europe’s ability to contribute to NATO combat operations.
The origins of this predicament stem from Europe’s pursuit
of a peace dividend in the post-Cold War period. European
force level reductions resulting from the Conventional
Forces in Europe treaty and the global recession in the early
1990s prompted governments to divert more funds from
defense budgets to domestic spending. In the process,
European governments particularly assigned a lower
budgetary priority to military research and development,
which has shrunk to approximately one-third of the U.S.
defense research budget.1
Insufficient apportionment of the gross domestic
product (GDP) to military spending has led to a significant
degradation of European military capabilities (Table 1).
NATO has established a goal of 2.0 percent of GDP as the
minimum apportionment for defense spending for the
purpose of maintaining burden sharing.2 Unfortunately,
half of the NATO members fail to meet the established goal
and appear incapable of meeting their obligations. 3
European counterclaims that much money is spent on
economic assistance to Eastern European countries and
similar activities are red herrings. This diversion of funds
may indeed enhance regional stability but does nothing for
the health of the Alliance. Financial obligations to the
Alliance should remain the dominant focus, but the political
will is lacking, particularly when domestic social issues are
2

more pressing. NATO has yet to address the arrears
adequately, and the decline in European armed forces
continues.

Table 1. Defense Expenditures of NATO States.
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Defense expenditures per troop indicate the general
sophistication of the respective armed forces. Ideally, small,
modernized active forces are the most use to the Alliance.
The larger the defense expenditure per troop, the more
interoperability is enhanced.4 Most of the bottom half falls
well below the average expenditure (excluding Iceland) of
$89,714, reflecting the wide disparity of sophistication
within the Alliance.
European NATO nations’ negligence of the armed forces
became apparent during the NATO-led operations in
Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). The United States bore
the brunt of the fighting in both air campaigns, flying
approximately 70 percent of the all sorties, expending 80
percent of the precision-guided munitions, and providing
practically all of the aviation electronic warfare support;
both operations revealed the growing technological gap
between the United States and the European allies.5
Specifically, the Kosovo conflict revealed deficiencies in
“cruise missiles, radar satellite observation systems,
offensive jammers, [and] aircraft identification systems.”6
European military capabilities have plummeted in other
areas as well. Strategic airlift capabilities are far from
adequate, and procurement of an intra-theater aircraft is
progressing very slowly. Reconnaissance and surveillance
platforms are few. Stand-off, precision guided munitions
take years to procure in proper amounts and require
extensive training of soldiers. Budget constraints have
lowered pilot flying hours below the minimum of 120 hours
per pilot per year.7
Admittedly, the Alliance has taken steps to correct the
European deficiencies. The 1999 Washington Summit
instituted the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), whose
goal was to close the capabilities gap and improve
interoperability.8 With an eye on the future, DCI sought to
“improve defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of
future multinational operations across the full spectrum of
Alliance missions . . .”9 The identified deficiencies were
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broken down into 59 measures and grouped into 5 discrete
areas:

•

Deployability and mobility;

•

Sustainability and logistics;

•

Survivability of forces and infrastructure;

•

Effective engagement; and,

•

Consultation, Command and Control and Information Systems.10

Unfortunately, 50 percent of the measures have proven
to be resource intensive and beyond the capabilities of the
individual members. Ultimately, any DCI improvement
requires cooperative initiatives, such as consortia, research
and development sharing, and the leasing or selling of
equipment.11 Given the numerous shortfalls of European
armed forces, it is little wonder that some in the United
States are reluctant to engage in coalition warfare with the
European allies. This is not to say that European NATO
nations cannot or will not increase their military
technology. Improvements will come, albeit slowly and
definitely lagging behind the United States. The technology
gap is symptomatic of a European attitude that the United
States will provide security assurance no matter how
insouciant European concerns. Casting aside all the
rhetoric of pan-Europeanists, the future European Union
will not likely progress beyond a confederacy of states, and
all the security problems associated with confederacies will
persist.
Organizational Shortcomings. European land forces are
still largely oriented towards territorial defense rather than
expeditionary missions. In view of NATO’s acceptance of
conflict prevention and crisis management tasks to include
peace support operations, European participation is
hampered by poor power projection capabilities and
manpower limitations as a result of conscription.12
5

In the past decade, European NATO countries have
downsized their armed forces with insufficient attention to
modernization and reform. They have reduced the number
of divisions, but the remaining forces are still as heavy as
their Cold War predecessors. Transforming land forces into
lighter, more agile, and more effective instruments is
expensive and time-consuming. Given the current levels of
military spending, the transformation of European armies
will progress slowly at best. Without strategic airlift or
sealift, European power projection capabilities are limited
mainly to rail and road transportation. Hence, for the most
part, European militaries are not tailored for crisis reaction
operations.
The issue of conscription is much more problematic.
While some European countries have professional armies,
many have retained conscription either wholly or partially
because it is the most cost effective way to fill the ranks.13
Conscript forces are not as capable as professional forces
because lower pay and shortened military service
obligations (ranging from 8 to 12 months) produce an
ill-trained and relatively unmotivated soldier.14
Conscription limits the force size a country can deploy to
a crisis area. Many countries with conscription cannot
legally deploy their conscripts out-of-area. Since conscripts
are largely lower-ranking soldiers—the work horses—the
officers and noncommissioned officers must take up the
slack. Moreover, soldiers in specialty positions (staff,
communications, intelligence, and so forth) are in high
demand and are deployed much more frequently than
planned. To fulfill the manpower requirements of a
deploying unit, nondeploying units must contribute
personnel and usually key equipment. Experience suggests
that peace support operations require the dedication of
three units (usually battalions) for each mission
requirement—the unit deployed, the unit preparing for the
deployment, and the unit recovering from the deployment.
Manpower problems multiply whenever a deployment or
multiple deployments lasts months, forcing the armed
6

forces to use the same personnel or units more often than
foreseen. Trained soldiers leave the service in frustration or
exhaustion. To counter this trend, some countries may offer
significant pay incentives, but this approach makes
extended deployments exorbitantly expensive and devours
the military budget.
The average term of European conscript service is 12
months or less. Even if a country permitted the use of
conscripts for out-of-area deployments, the deployment
window of opportunity is small. The average conscript
spends 4-6 months for initial training. Soldiers need at least
a month in a unit before they become familiar with
procedures. Since most crises rarely fall in sync with the
conscription service cycle, the deployment time of each
conscript will only be a few months. Without any special
crisis provisions in national laws, managing the personnel
requirements alone during a crisis can be overwhelming.
Conversion to a professional army has ramifications
though. Countries that have converted to a volunteer force
without concomitant increases in incentives suffer acute
manpower shortages. Without adequate pay, medical and
retirement benefits, accommodations, and family
incentives among others, few citizens will volunteer to serve
their country for a 3-year tour. Investment in the soldier is
not the only expense either. Recruitment requires
sophisticated marketing initiatives, meaning the
government must engage a professional marketing firm to
be successful. Demographics for each country are unique. A
recruitment campaign for one country may not work in
another. For example, the United States promises financial
support for college in its recruitment advertisements. Such
an approach means little to Europeans since college is
almost regarded as a right. It may be that a European will
respond to the societal prestige of military service.
Regardless, a successful recruitment program requires
significant financing.
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Because of the need for incentives and the concomitant
expenses, the size of European professional armies will be
small, perhaps no more than one to two divisions per
country. Whether a country relies on conscription or a
professional force, the result is fewer forces available for
crisis reaction operations.
NATO Structural Shortcomings.
Integrated Military Structure Shortcomings. NATO’s
integrated military structure still retains much of its Cold
War arrangements, making it ill-suited for expeditionary
operations and limiting the benefits of enlargement.
Despite the shift towards multinational formations,
NATO’s basic military building block still rests on national
divisions, meaning that each member country contributes
divisions to the Alliance for use in traditional Article 5
(collective defense) or non-Article 5 (conflict prevention and
crisis management to include peace support operations).
This arrangement was practicable during the Cold War
since the Alliance’s sole focus was on territorial collective
defense, and the need for simplicity overrode any initiatives
towards greater military efficiency among its members.
NATO organized the General Defense Plan of Germany into
eight national corps, whose commanders retained crucial
command authorities, e.g. authority over training, logistics,
task organization, and mission assignments, among
others.15 Theoretically, greater military coordination could
be effected among the members upon a war alert since the
Alliance could expect a few weeks of preparation time before
the Warsaw Pact could generate the needed offensive power
for an attack.
With NATO’s extension of its mandate to include
non-Article 5 missions, these Cold War arrangements
required revision. The shift from a territorial orientation to
an expeditionary posture has profound implications on the
ground forces. Unlike air and naval forces, ground forces
require closer tactical cooperation in expeditionary
8

operations. As Dr. Thomas-Durell Young has correctly
observed, “‘(L)and forces’ are not discrete independent units
which can be easily employed tactically in combined
operations (like ships and aircraft), but rather are
comprised of combined arms teams made up of various
subset formations, each of which may have different
mission-essential tasks assigned to them.”16 As crisis
response operations permit little time for mission
preparation among coalition partners, mission success is
jeopardized.
NATO’s relatively recent adoption of multinational
corps and multinational divisions is an attempt at greater
integration but has fallen short primarily due to political
sensibilities and the physical stationing of subordinate
units in their parent countries rather than under the
assigned headquarters. In his extensive studies on NATO’s
military structures, Young has identified three enduring
major shortcomings with the multinational corps—
command authority, transfer of authority, and corps CSS.17
These deficiencies alone hamper effective deployment.
The issue of sovereignty has deprived multinational
corps commanders of proper command authority. NATO
allies balk at yielding crucial command authority to
commanders of multinational corps in peacetime and
insufficient command authority during non-Article 5
operations. Without the authority to train their
subordinate units to standards in peacetime or the freedom
to control them tactically during a conflict, corps
commanders are hamstrung. By extension, the ambiguity
concerning the “transfer of authority” (TOA), the moment
when the contributing nation allows the commanding
general to take charge of its forces, adds to the confusion.18
The opportunity for subordinate units composing
multinational corps or multinational divisions to conduct
collectiv e tra in ing i s l i mi ted bec ause they ar e
geographically separated by dozens of miles. Their first
opportunity to operate together as a cohesive force is during
9

a deployment. Under such circumstances, operations in a
crisis region will be sub par until units become accustomed
to operating together. For crises that require decisive
intervention, mission accomplishment will be endangered.
The absence of corps CSS units for all corps, except the
Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),
hamstrings rapid deployment of NATO land forces. Allied
members do not even allocate CSS units to the
multinational corps, and even earmarking such units in
peacetime to specific corps remains unfulfilled. For any
type of crisis response operation, CSS support becomes ad
hoc, wasteful, and chaotic because the corps commanders
will need to solicit contributions from respective nations
during the deployment phase.19 This state of affairs is
hardly conducive to rapid decisive operations.
The Impact of Enduring Deficiencies on NATO
Enlargement.
Whatever the problems associated with the old members
contributing to the Alliance, they pale in comparison to the
new members and the candidates’ challenges. Simply put,
assimilation into the Alliance is beyond the means of the
newcomers in the short term unless NATO makes
appropriate accommodations.
The New Members. Under NATO’s current organizational structure, enlargement does little to strengthen the
Alliance in real terms. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have added about 200,000 troops to the Alliance,
but increased membership without the ability to harness
the military potential provides more fat than muscle.20
In preparation for their inclusion in NATO’s integrated
military structure, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic continue restructuring and modernizing their
armed forces. Military reforms are progressing reasonably
well but suffer from a lack of funding, and the pace of
modernization is directly tied to economic progress and
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force reductions. If either falters, then so does the pace of
modernization and reform.
Poland has undertaken a progressive restructuring and
modernization program called the “Komorowski Plan,”
which is to culminate in 2006. The objective is to reduce its
armed forces to 150,000 service members, of which 75,000
will be professional soldiers, by 2006. Conscription has been
reduced to a 12-month service obligation. Poland is
reducing the percentage of senior officers to 30 percent of
the total force, and reorganizing its general staff along the
lines of the U.S. Joint Staff. The army is buying 128
German Leopard 2A4 tanks, converting its T-72 tanks to
NATO standards, producing a new infantry fighting vehicle
(KTO), and making similar upgrades with other weapon
systems. Of course, the pace of modernization greatly
depends on the economy. Poland has declared four brigades
for NATO’s immediate and rapid reaction forces and two
divisions for the main defense forces (30,000 troops total).21
Hungary’s 10-year modernization plan comprises three
phases ending in 2010. Hungary is reducing its armed
forces to 37,500 by 2003 and plans to end conscription by
2010. It is reorganizing the general staff along the lines of
the U.S. Joint Staff. It has declared a combat battalion, a
military intelligence company, two antiaircraft platoons,
and military police unit for the Immediate Reaction Force, a
brigade to the ARRC, and one tank brigade, five infantry
brigades, as well as antiaircraft, artillery, engineer and
support units for the main defense forces. Hungary has
provided the Tászár Air Base in support of the Bosnia peace
mission, and Hungary’s geographic location provides NATO
with access to the Balkans.22
The Czech Republic has no formal plans to reduce the
armed forces, but a general staff study recommends a
reduction to 45,000 by 2010. It is retaining conscription
with a 12-month service obligation. The army is upgrading
around 120 of its T-72 tanks and plans to modernize 70
percent of its equipment. Additionally, the air force is
11

investing in a modern L-159 subsonic fighter jet. The Czech
Republic has allotted 8,400 troops for the immediate and
rapid reaction forces and has declared its rapid reaction
brigade to the ARRC by 2002 (47,000 troops total).23
The fact remains that the new NATO members are
having trouble integrating into the Alliance. The Soviet
military doctrinal legacy persists. All have hundreds of
T-55 tanks, which are obsolete. Poland’s armed forces still
have a low level of training. Most training is conducted at
battalion level and only in garrison instead of the field.
Brigade level exercises are infrequent. Pilots only fly 60
hours per year, whereas the NATO minimum standard is
120 hours. The Hungarian army conducts inadequate
training, is not “modern” (e.g., lacking unit tasks,
conditions, and standards), and has too much obsolete
Soviet equipment. Defense spending has recently declined
to 1.51 percent due to the diversion of funds for natural
disaster relief. Initial force reductions disproportionately
affected the manpower levels of operational units, resulting
in a manpower deficit. The Czech army conducts no
training above company level and needs to improve its
English language training. Most of its equipment is also of
obsolete Soviet make. The L-159 fighter jet is consuming 70
percent of the military budget and does not seem worth the
investment since its pilot training averages 60 hours per
year.24
Attempting to reach technical interoperability is an
expensive process and in view of the old members’
difficulties in attaining the DCI objectives, the prognosis for
new members with their nascent market economies is that
technical interoperability problems will persist. Procedural
interoperability is a matter of training with NATO
procedures. Given the Soviet military doctrinal legacy and
the infrequent opportunities to train with other NATO
partners, internalizing NATO procedures will likely
proceed slowly.
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The Candidate States. The members of NATO’s
Membership Action Plan (MAP): Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic,
Albania, and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of
Macedonia, are candidates for membership during the
Prague Summit in November 2002. While some have a
better chance than others this round, all suffer from
persistent military capability problems.
As with NATO members, the NATO candidates must
contribute 2 percent of their GDP to defense spending. At
first glance, NATO’s requirement may seem arbitrary since
so many NATO members do not meet the requirement, but
the 2 percent apportionment goal ensures candidates
devote sufficient funding to the military for the transition
into NATO’s integrated military structure. Currently, only
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania can meet the standard
(Table 2).

Table 2. Defense Expenditures.
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Defense expenditures per troop, depicting the general
sophistication of the armed forces, are much more
problematic. The NATO European median is $82,602
(Italy), with Poland having the lowest expenditure of
$14,727. A low figure of defense expenditures per troop
indicates a lower level of technological sophistication,
making interoperability very difficult to attain. Taken
together, these figures determine whether a candidate
nation is a potential contributor or a parasite to NATO.25
Only Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia meet or
surpass Poland. No candidate shows much promise of
attaining interoperability without significant assistance.
An overview of candidate armed forces reveals that
persisten t, deep- r ooted p r obl ems wi l l mar any
contributions to NATO’s integrated military structure.
Enlargement does enhance stability and increase European
security, but in the realm of military capabilities, NATO’s
military structure will not benefit much.
Albania’s active army consists of 40,000 soldiers, of
which 22,500 are conscripts (12-month service obligation).
The active force structure is in the process of reform and
should comprise seven divisions and a commando brigade.
The navy has 2,500 sailors operating numerous coast guard
vessels. The air force has 4,500 airmen operating 98 combat
aircraft; of course, how many are actually operational is
questionable. The equipment is a mixture of old Soviet and
Chinese origin.26 Interoperability with NATO would be
poor.
The Bulgarian army has an active force of 42,400, of
which 33,300 are conscripts (12-month service obligation).
The active force structure consists of four mechanized
infantry divisions, four armor brigades, three mechanized
infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, and several air
defense and artillery regiments. The navy has 5,260 sailors
(2,000 conscripts) with one submarine, a frigate, and
several coast guard vessels. The air force has 18,300 airmen
with 181 combat aircraft and 43 attack helicopters. Pilots
14

average 30 to 40 flying hours per year. All equipment is
Soviet vintage, much of it quite old.27 Interoperability with
NATO would be poor.
Estonia’s active army consists of 4,800 soldiers, of which
2,870 are conscripts (12-month service obligation). The
active force structure comprises five infantry battalions,
one artillery battalion, one guard battalion, and one
reconnaissance battalion. The navy has 250 sailors (140
conscripts) with several coast guard vessels. The air force
has 140 airmen operating 3 aircraft and 7 helicopters. Pilot
training averages 70 flying hours per year. Equipment is
scant and of Soviet origin.28 Interoperability with NATO
would be poor.
The Latvian active army has 2,400 soldiers, including
1,690 conscripts (12-month service obligation). The active
force structure consists of one infantry battalion, one
reconnaissance battalion, one Special Forces team, one
peacekeeping company, and one artillery unit. The navy
has 840 sailors (360 conscripts) with several coast guard
vessels. The air force has 210 airmen operating 19 aircraft
and 4 helicopters.29 Equipment is of Soviet origin and old,
and interoperability with NATO would be poor.
Lithuania’s active army has 9,340 soldiers, including
3,720 conscripts (12-month service obligation). The active
force structure comprises two motorized rifle brigades, one
light infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, and one
peacekeeping company. The navy has 560 sailors (280
conscripts) manning several coast guard vessels. The air
force has 800 airmen operating 27 aircraft and 12
helicopters.30 Equipment is of Soviet origin and old.
Interoperability with NATO would be poor.
Macedonia has an active force of 16,000 soldiers, of
which 8,000 are conscripts (9-month service obligation).
The active force structure consists of 2 brigades and a border
guard brigade. The air force has 700 airmen operating 10
aircraft and 4 helicopters. The equipment is a mixture of
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quite old Soviet origin and U.S. equipment.31 Interoperability with NATO would be poor.
The Romanian active army has 106,000 active soldiers,
including 71,000 conscripts (12-month service obligation).
The active force structure has about 18 mechanized infantry
brigades, 7 armor brigades, 7 mountain brigades, 1 guards
brigade, 1 engineer regiment, and several air defense and
artillery brigades. The navy comprises 20,800 (12,600
conscripts) with 1 submarine, 1 destroyer, 6 frigates, and
several coast guard vessels. Moreover, it has 10,200 marine
infantry. The air force has 43,500 airmen (25,000
conscripts). It possesses 323 combat aircraft and 16 attack
helicopters with pilots having an average of 40 flying hours
per year. Two airborne brigades also belong to the air force.
Much of the equipment is Soviet made and very old. 32
Interoperability with NATO would be poor.
Slovakia has an active army of 23,800 soldiers, of which
13,600 are conscripts (12-month service obligation). The
active force structure has an armor brigade, a mechanized
infantry brigade, an artillery brigade, and a rapid reaction
battalion. The air force comprises 11,500 airmen with 84
combat aircraft and 19 attack helicopters. Pilot training
averages 45 flying hours per year. All the equipment is
Soviet vintage and would have poor interoperability with
NATO.33
Slovenia’s active army contains 9,000 soldiers, of which
4,000 to 5,000 are conscripts (7-month service obligation).
The active force structure comprises seven infantry
battalions, two independent mechanized battalions, one
Special Forces brigade, a surface-to-air missile brigade, an
aviation brigade (eight armed helicopters), and an artillery
battalion. All equipment is a mixture of Soviet and
Yugoslavian production and would have poor interoperability with NATO.34
Conscription makes up 50 percent or more of the
candidate nation armed forces. The retention of
conscription is likely to remain in the near term because of
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the expense associated with professional armies.
Depending on the laws regarding the deployment of
conscripts, the actual size of a deploying force for crisis
response may be a mere pittance.
The size of the armed forces, especially for Article 5
missions, is a serious issue regarding integration into a
battle. For high tempo combat operations, force size
contributions below a brigade are of dubious value since
they are difficult to integrate into larger maneuver units
capable of conducting combat tasks. A national contribution of a combat battalion or company would need to be
integrated into a brigade or division in order to generate the
needed combat power for successful combat operations. If
such small units have no opportunity to conduct extensive,
collective training with their host brigades prior to a
military operation, they will lack the necessary skills to
accomplish assigned missions. Since a contribution of a
brigade-sized force is beyond the capabilities of smaller
members, NATO must address how to integrate smaller
combat units into its structure.
Countries with Soviet equipment, especially aircraft,
would have severe difficulties operating with NATO.
Differences in communications, avionics, and computerization would hamper interoperability. Soviet-made aircraft
would not participate in a NATO air campaign because of
incompatibilities and the dangers of fratricide. Soviet
armored vehicles, particularly the older models, would
create more confusion that contribution. The inventories of
all the MAP countries consist of Soviet T55 and T72 tanks as
well as BTR and BMP armored personnel carriers, which
either need to be scrapped or upgraded to NATO standards.
Upgrading Soviet vehicles to NATO standards may create
fresh problems, given the plethora of Soviet exports during
the Cold War to potential adversaries. Given the fog of war
in conflicts, NATO members would have problems
distinguishing friend from foe and risk fratricide. In the
final analysis, it is cheaper and easier simply to invest in
western equipment and weapons.
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The Necessary Restructuring.
Clearly, the European contribution to NATO is
deteriorating. Without an imminent threat, NATO’s
European partners are unlikely to devote a greater part of
their GDP to defense. Because power projection is a stated
task of crisis management missions and because the
European allies are unwilling or unable to improve these
capabilities, NATO must make some innovative reforms.
Otherwise, the United States will continue to bear the lion’s
share of every conflict and operation.
The Integrated Multinational Division and the Impact
on New Members. The Alliance must adopt a force structure
that allows the assimilation of new members into the
integrated military structure. The Cold War approach of
separate national divisions within the Alliance was
sufficient under pure collective defense, but, with the
addition of collective security tasks, interoperability and
defense budget austerity assume greater prominence.
The Alliance needs to take the bold step and transform
its divisions into IMDs. Such an initiative allows the
member states to downsize their aggregate force
contribution without reducing their commitment to the
Alliance. Additionally, such divisions permit assured and
swift integration and interoperability of new members.
The IMD reconciles the deficiencies associated with
multinational units. As Thomas-Durell Young correctly
points out, “multinational land formations are, by their very
nature, less efficient and less effective than a similar pure
national formation. Differences in language, weapon
systems, organization, logistics, and procedures, all hinder
the operation of multinational formations.”35 Such friction
occurs because multinational units rarely operate as an
integrated force until thrown together for a crisis. The IMD
model mitigates this friction by integrating allies at a much
lower level and co-locating all the division subordinate
units.
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As a matter of illustration, transforming a U.S. division
into an IMD is a relatively easy process. Retaining its
divisional headquarters, a maneuver brigade, and an
aviation brigade, the U.S. IMD allocates unit assignments
according to new members’ contributive capabilities and
size (Figure 1). In this manner, new members can
specialize, that is, modernize selected units instead of
attempting to modernize their entire armed forces
immediately. Because smaller countries can only
contribute small forces (ranging in size from a company to
brigade), these units would make a greater contribution as
an integral part of a division. Integrating smaller units into
an IMD is much more manageable than clustering a
multinational corps with dozens of discrete, small units.
Each unit retains its existing organizational structure since
its soldiers are accustomed to it, and it is unlikely to have a
negative impact on military operations. Contributing
members retain their national integrity through their units
and are responsible for personnel and equipment
requirements. Participating nations would also contribute
personnel to the division headquarters, combat support,
and combat service support units.

Figure 1. Idealized Integrated Multination Division.
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The question of sovereignty is a crucial issue. No nation
likes the idea of another country commanding its forces.
“Nations have been loath to give up command authorities
over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that, inter
alia, they will be ‘fragmented’ or improperly commanded.”36
Given the size of each unit contribution, fragmentation is
not an issue. The issue of command authority is a matter of
trust, which resolves itself after a period of training and
familiarization with the division. In matters of training, the
unit commander retains full responsibility. Naturally, he
submits his training plan to division for final review and
approval, but this administrative function does not impinge
on his own command authority. For contributing members
the advantages are self-evident—yielding a modicum of
sovereignty in exchange for assured contributions to the
Alliance.
The IMD provides the opportunity for all members to
demonstrate their value to the Alliance. It may seem a
small matter, but competitive activities, such as tank and
artillery gunnery, marksmanship matches, and Best
Ranger competition, as well as the participation in the
Expert Infantryman Badge and Expert Medical Badge
tests, greatly enhance individual and unit pride and esprit
de corps. Working towards tangible goals and being
rewarded for them probably do more to engender NATO
cohesion than any other factor. The IMD is the best vehicle
for building this sense of belongingness.
To improve equipment interoperability, NATO allies
may lease or sell equipment to new members. Such an
approach to integration is much cheaper than expecting
new members to develop and produce needed equipment on
their own. For its own IMD, the United States can offer to
lease or sell existing division organic equipment that is
already in Europe. Regardless, each contributing member
state can focus its modernization to key units initially and
modernize the rest of its armed forces over time. If the
contributor accepts the U.S. sell/lease program, the supply
channels are strictly American. If not, the supply channels
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emanate from the contributing country. Each member state
assigns maintenance and supply troops to the combat
service support brigade. In this manner, member countries
become accustomed to U.S. maintenance, supply, and
reporting procedures. The same approach holds true for the
rest of the Alliance.
To improve procedural interoperability, participation in
training activities, such as weapons qualification,
individual and collective training, field exercises, and
planning processes, expose new members to NATO’s
military methods and procedures, enhancing the
integration process immensely. The new NATO members
are not thoroughly familiar with the concepts of Task,
Conditions, and Standards, the Mission Essential Task
Listing, Troop Leading Procedures, the five-paragraph
Operations Order, the Deliberate Decision-Making Process,
and so forth. Most of these concepts require some mentoring
because they are Western in design and a little arcane,
particularly for the military cultures steeped in Soviet
doctrine. Relying solely on classroom instruction to teach
NATO-compatible procedures and practices is not sufficient
because the concepts require frequent application in
training. Without practice and personal assistance, new
members may give up in frustration and simply go through
the motions. Under the tutelage of their NATO hosts, they
can focus on these concepts and procedures, resolve issues
as they arise, and assimilate them.
One of the greatest obstacles for the armed forces of new
members is learning English. Language immersion is the
most effective and quickest way for non-English speakers to
gain proficiency. Use of existing host nation facilities,
barracks, and housing, as well as access to television and
radio programs (British Broad Cast, Armed Forces
Network, etc.), would expose foreign national soldiers and
their families to English and Western culture. Daily
contacts with host nation soldiers and families also expose
new members to Western democratic values. Since the
NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) pays for the
21

infrastructure, opening existing casernes to new members
would actually lower expenses. Immediate use of existing
barracks, training areas, ranges, housing, and facilities
provide powerful incentives for new member states. It is
highly unlikely that any country would pass up such an
opportunity. Furthermore, the influence of the Western
armed forces will slowly permeate the contributing nations
as soldiers rotate through the IMD.
Admittedly, some cultural differences merit mention.
For instance, some contributing nations may permit female
soldiers in combat units or gays in the military. Such issues
remain within the purview of the relevant commander, and
the host nation headquarters should accommodate the
cultural differences without derailing the integrated
concept.
The IMDs permit greater participation in collective
defense and the new crisis response missions. Integrated
membership negates the ad hoc character of contingency
missions and allows all members, regardless of their size, to
participate more effectively and efficiently. In this manner,
instead of the few shouldering the burden of security,
responsibility is evenly distributed throughout the Alliance.
Although the initial readiness of the IMD will be low,
readiness will increase rapidly with the series of phased,
train-up activities, culminating in certification. As with any
initiative, the devil is in the details, but the U.S. Army can
meet these challenges and truly integrate new members
into the Alliance. Once this initiative is proven, other
NATO countries can elect to adopt the IMD structure with
new and old members, producing thoroughly modern and
cohesive units at less cost and manpower.
The Impact on the Rest of the Alliance. The IMD could
provide crucial opportunities for all Alliance members.
Given the inadequate military spending expenditures,
manpower and technology deficiencies, and lowered
readiness, the IMD could permit allies to consolidate their
scarce military resources. Countries could equip their
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designated IMD units with the most modern and lighter
equipment and weapon systems and fill the ranks with
professional soldiers vice conscripts.
NATO’s Defense
Requirements Review, which determines the number of
divisions based on mission needs, will need to adjust the
numbers if the IMD concept is adopted.
The ARRC already has a number of standard,
multinational divisions, so the framework for a transition to
the IMD exists. The 10 divisions of the ARRC are sufficient
to conduct crisis management and immediate collective
defense. The ARRC would comprise high readiness land
forces, meaning they receive priority in manpower, funding,
and modernization. To be truly effective though, the
subordinate units of each IMD must be physically
consolidated under a designated headquarters. The host
country, with funding from the NSIP, would be responsible
for implementing the infrastructure upgrades for air and
sea ports of debarkation. The existing national
headquarters should remain in order to minimize turmoil.
Multinational Division (South) remains unspecified, but
France is well-positioned to stand it up if it is so disposed,
and the facilities in southern France are sufficient to
support it. The U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy
is logically positioned fill out the 3d Italian Infantry
Division (Mechanized) (Table 3).37
A U.S. Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) can
comprise the immediate reaction force of the ARRC,
permitting rapid deployment of the most modern force and
underscoring America’s continued commitment to the
Alliance. Its stationing near Ramstein Air Base in
Germany (perhaps nearby Baumholder) ensures rapid
deployment.
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Table 3. ARRC Integrated Multinational Divisions.
The ARRC needs a Special Forces Group (SFG)
comprising teams from all Alliance members in order to
ensure early engagement into potential crisis regions. The
amount of expertise and knowledge that the various
member states’ special forces possess makes the ARRC SFG
indispensable. The former U.S. Special Forces caserne at
Bad Tolz, Germany, would be a perfect location for training.
The ARRC has an established CSS capability (actually
the only NATO corps CSS), which all members can augment
without effort or added expense.38 Given his unique
position, the ARRC commander would need an “Integrated
Directing and Control Authority” similar to the authority
g ra n ted to th e c ommand i ng gener al of the I
German/Netherlands Corps. This authority is needed to
assure that the forces are trained according to task,
conditions, and standards. Upon alert, the TOA
automatically falls to the ARRC commander in order to
permit proper command and control.39 The command of the
ARRC rotates among the allies, demonstrating not only
shared contributions but also shared authority. In this
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matter, all the Allies have a chance to be chiefs instead of
indians.
Streamlining NATO’s Subordinate Corps. The divisions
of the lower readiness forces operate with reduced readiness
without a significant impact on the effectiveness of the
Alliance. Other than mobilization for a major war,
activation of the lower readiness forces is predicated on the
augmentation or rotation of deployed ARRC divisions in a
crisis region. Pragmatically, establishing higher and lower
readiness forces permits the European allies to focus assets
on their designated IMD units. The economic savings in
essential areas—lower manpower requirements, fewer
units to maintain, and fewer weapons and equipment to
field—permit a greater focus on technological innovations.
Although fewer divisions represent a calculated risk, the
smaller, integrated ARRC permits the Europeans to resolve
the DCI deficiencies at less cost, manpower, and resources.
Despite the reliance on the ARRC for most missions, the
Alliance will still need to maintain at least two additional
corps headquarters (EUROCORPS and EUROFOR) for
extended peace support operations. These additional
command and control headquarters are crucial to ensure
key corps staff, communications, and intelligence
personnel, among others, are not overdeployed. Sustaining
a peace support operation requires that personnel and
equipment have a chance to recover; otherwise the system
begins to break down. These headquarters require the most
modern and robust command and control systems in order
to communicate to the parent headquarters and host
nations, as well as the forward deployed subordinate units.
Command and control cannot be an ad hoc affair with
obsolete systems.
Conclusion.
Establishing IMDs allows faster assimilation of new
members as well as increasing interoperability within
NATO. The opportunity to buy or lease western equipment
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allows new members to invest more money into their
economies, which is an important goal for emerging market
economies. Designating a few units for the IMD allows new
countries to specialize and modernize without exorbitant
defense budgets. Integration precludes the need of
individual nations establishing separate logistical units in
support of contingency missions. New members will acquire
greater proficiency of English through immersion. By
frequent participation in collective training, new members
gain a greater appreciation for NATO training, planning,
maintenance, and supply procedures. Moreover, soldiers
and their families gain a greater understanding of Western
democratic values and culture, which in turn will find its
way to the home country, forging greater bonds.
If the Alliance does not adopt the IMD concept, NATO
will not realize its full potential as a cohesive force.
Enlargement will add to the collection of members, but the
contributions of individual members will be limited.
Heretofore, the burden of military operations rested on a
few members. The current structure does not allow all
members to contribute to every operation because the
Alliance cannot integrate them fully. The IMD paradigm
allows integration of even the smallest members and
permits greater economy in military spending. Under this
structure, members may be able to lower their military
spending to 1.5 percent of their GDP without a drop in
capabilities.
Recommendations.
The United States can improve its strategic position and
cohesion by pursuing the following:

•

Convert the two U.S. divisions in Europe into IMDs in
order to assist in the assimilation of new members
into the Alliance.
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•

Encourage other NATO members to adopt this model
in order to make more effective use of their military
spending and resources.

•

Establish the ARRC as NATO’s higher readiness
force for all missions and maintain the EUROCORPS
and EUROFOR corps headquarters, sufficiently
staffed and equipped with the most modern and
robust command and control systems. Rotate the
command of the ARRC among the contributing
members.

•

Expand the existing ARRC CS and CSS base into an
Area Support Group (ASG) equivalent to provide
assured logistics during training and deployments.
The ASG must be sufficiently large to support
multiple rotations during extended PSO.

NATO cannot afford to rest on its laurels and transform
the Alliance into a European country club. NATO embodies
U.S. European policy at 30 percent of the cost to the United
States. The Alliance provides hope to nonmembers and
security for members. The restructuring to IMDs ensures
that NATO remains relevant, resolves many of the current
command authority and training issues and eliminates the
need for superfluous and potentially competing European
military security initiatives. The emerging strategic
environment demands greater efficiency and cooperation
among the Alliance members, and the integrated
multinational division structure meets these challenges.
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